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Abstract
It is known that sunspots can trigger panic-based bank runs and that the optimal banking
contract can tolerate panic-based runs. The existing literature assumes that these sunspots
are based on a publicly observed, extrinsic randomizing device. In this paper, I extend the
analysis of panic-based runs to include an asymmetric-information, extrinsic randomizing device.
Depositors observe di¤erent, but correlated, signals on the stability of the bank. I nd that if
the signals that depositors obtain are highly correlated, there exists a correlated equilibrium
for some demand deposit contracts. In this equilibrium, a full bank run, a partial bank run, or
non-bank run occurs depending on the realization of the signals. Computed examples indicate
that in some economies, a demand-deposit contract that tolerates bank runs and partial bank
runs is optimal, whereas in some other economies a run-proof contract is optimal.
JEL Classication Numbers: D82, G21, P11
Keywords: Bank runs, randomizing device, sunspot equilibrium, correlated equilibrium,
imperfect information.
1 Introduction
In the classic Diamond and Dybvig (1983) bank runs model, bank runs are triggered by a commonly
observed random variable, which is modeled formally by Peck and Shell (2003) as a sunspot variable.
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The sunspot variable does not a¤ect any of the fundamentals, such as endowment, preference,
or technology. Depositors perfectly observe the realization of the sunspot, and they make their
withdrawal decisions accordingly, given that everyone else makes the same decision. An individual
depositor faces no uncertainty when he makes the withdrawal decision, for he knows all other
depositors will behave in the same way because they observe the same thing. Thus, the publicly
observed sunspot serves as a randomizing device, and the probability of bank runs depends solely
on the distribution of the sunspot variable.
In this paper, I consider a more general extrinsic randomizing device in the sense that depositors
receive di¤erent, but correlated, sunspot signals. Depositors are grouped into networks according
to their observation of the signals. Depositors in the same network share sunspot information, but
depositors do not share information among networks. Receiving their own signals of the sunspot,
depositors try to infer the signals that others observe and the actions they take. In this situation,
a depositor faces uncertainty when he makes a withdrawal decision, as other people might observe
very di¤erent signals and make di¤erent decisions.
For simplicity, there are only two networks in the model. Each network observes a sunspot signal
that takes a value of either 0 or 1. Signals are imperfectly correlated. This is the minimum structure
required for the analysis of imperfect coordination. I nd that if the signals that depositors obtain
are highly correlated, there exists a correlated equilibrium for some demand deposit contracts. In
this equilibrium, a full bank run, a partial bank run, or a non-bank run occurs, depending on
the realization of the signals. Depositors are coordinated by the imperfectly correlated sunspot
signals in the equilibrium. Thus, the sunspot signals serve as an imperfect randomizing device.
The probabilities of bank runs and partial runs are determined by the joint distribution of the
sunspot signals.
By assuming a more general extrinsic randomizing device, I intend to capture a more general
situation in the economy: Our judgment of the economy is based on di¤erent information sources.
Even if we have the same information, our interpretation of the information can be di¤erent. How
does an individual depositor make his decisions, knowing others might have di¤erent information
and might make di¤erent judgments? The extrinsic uncertainty can be understood as the intrinsic
uncertainty taken to the limit. By focusing on the extrinsic uncertainty, I explain that there exist
multiple equilibrium outcomes, due to the imperfect coordination among the depositors in the
absence of any fundamental shocks. Empirical studies show that most banking crises are extrinsic-
driven panic runs (Boyd et al., 2001). Specically, before most banking crises happen, no indicator
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of the economy serves as a good predictor. Nevertheless, the randomizing device in this paper can
be understood in either way: as an intrinsic variable taken to the limit or as a pure randomizing
device.
Partial bank runs are the unique result of an imperfect coordination device. A partial run results
in a lower level of welfare than a non-bank run, however, it does less damage than a full bank run.
In this regard, this paper implies that imperfect coordination due to asymmetric information can
be a reason why some banking crises are more serious than others.
Given the possibility that the bank runs happen ex post, the demand-deposit contract that
admits the rst-best allocation is usually not optimal (Postlewaite and Vives (1987)). Cooper and
Ross (1998) show that with a perfect randomizing device, if the probability of bank runs is small,
then the optimal demand-deposit contract admits a run equilibrium; otherwise, a run-proof contract
will be provided. Peck and Shell (2003) illustrate that within a broad class of banking mechanisms
including partial suspension of convertibility, the optimal contract can tolerate bank runs if the
probability is small. This paper conrms the ndings of these authors. In some economies, full
bank runs and partial bank runs are tolerated.
This paper focuses on a simple demand-deposit contract. A simple demand-deposit contract is
widely used in the banking industry. However, the results in my model obtain in a broad class of
banking mechanisms. In the appendix, I consider a contract that allows for partial suspension of
convertibility. The results still hold.
There is some literature that is related to this model. Soloman (2003, 2004) considers an
imperfectly correlated sunspot randomizing device in a twin-crisis model. By assuming ex-ante
di¤erent types of agents, the banking aspect of the twin crisis is reduced to a traditional sunspot
equilibrium model. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) construct a model by the approach of global
games in which the noisy signal about fundamentals determines the decisions of the depositors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model set-up.
Section 3 discusses the equilibrium in the postdeposit game. Section 4 discuss the optimal contract
in the predeposit game. Section 5 addresses the conclusions.
2 The Model
There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2; and a measure 1 of depositors in the economy. Each depositor is
endowed with 1 unit of consumption good in period 0. There is a measure of  (0 <  < 1) impatient
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depositors; the rest are patient. Impatient depositors derive utility only from consumption in period
1. Their utility is described by u(c1); where c1 is the consumption received at t = 1. Patient
depositors consume in the last period. If a patient depositor receives consumption at t = 1; he
can store it costlessly and consume it at t = 2: Thus, a patient depositors utility is described by
u(c1+c2); where c2 is the consumption received at t = 2: The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of
the utility function,  xu00(x)=u0(x); is greater than 1 for x  1: The utility function is normalized to
0 at x = 0, that is, u(0) = 0. Whether a depositor is patient or impatient is his private information
and is revealed to the individual depositor at t = 1.
The investment technology is as follows: One unit of consumption goods invested in period 0
yields 1 unit in period 1 and R (R > 1) units in period 2.
The banking market is competitive. The representative bank o¤ers a demand-deposit contract,
which describes the amount of consumption goods paid to the depositors who withdraw deposits
in periods 1 (c1) and 2 (c2), respectively. The bank pays c1 to the depositors until it runs out
of resources. It distributes the remaining resources equally among the depositors who wait until
the last period. Therefore, c2 = max
n
0; 1 nc
1
1 n R
o
; where n (0  n  1) denotes the measure of
depositors who withdraw the deposits in period 1. Depositors are isolated from one another (see
Wallace (1988)).
Depositors are grouped into two networks. Network i observes a sunspot variable, i; i = 1; 2.
i = f0; 1g. 1 and 2 are imperfectly correlated. The joint distribution of 1 and 2 is denoted
by Pr(1; 2) = p12 ,
P1
2=0
P1
1=0
p12 = 1. The marginal probabilities are dened by p1 =P1
2=0
p12 and p2 =
P1
1=0
p12 :
Networks do not communicate with each other. Depositors in the same network share the
information of the sunspot they obtain and conjecture the sunspot signal that the other network
observes. The conditional distribution, derived from the joint distribution, is Pr(2 j 1) = p12
p1
:
Network i has a measure of ni depositors. By law of large numbers, the measure of impatient
depositors in network i is ni; i = 1; 2. Impatient depositors withdraw at t = 1 regardless of other
peoples decisions. Patient depositors make withdrawal decisions given all available information.
Depositors know ex ante that there are two networks, but they do not know which network they
will be in until t = 1.
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The sequence of timing is as follows:
Bank announces the contract;
Depositors make investment decision.
9=; t = 0
Consumption types are revealed;
Information shock is realized;
Depositors make withdrawal decision.
9>>=>>; t = 1
Bank allocates the remaining resources
to the rest of the depositors.
9=; t = 2
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
post
deposit
game
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
pre
deposit
game
The postdeposit game starts from t = 1 and ends at t = 2. In the postdeposit game, the
depositors are assumed to have already deposited at the bank. Depositors determine whether
to withdraw deposits or not, given the banking contract. Knowing how depositors behave in the
postdeposit game, at t = 0; the bank decides which contract to o¤er, and depositors decide whether
or not to accept the o¤er. The entire game, played from t = 0 to t = 2, is called the predeposit
game.
3 Postdeposit Game
A demand-deposit banking contract in the postdeposit game m = (c1; c2) satises
c2 = max

0;
1  nc1
1  n R

; where 0  n  1; c1  0; (1)
where n is the proportion of depositors who withdraw early.
The participation incentive compatibility constraint is dened as
u

1  c1
1   R

 u(c1); (2)
which means that if all patient depositors wait until period 2, a patient depositor should receive at
least the same amount of consumption goods the impatient depositors received in period 1. This is
the minimum requirement for a banking contract so that the patient depositors are willing to wait.
Given a demand-deposit contract satisfying (2), if all other patient depositors are honest about
their consumption type, then an individual depositor would nd waiting until t = 2 a better choice
than withdrawing immediately at t = 1.
Let M denote the set that includes all banking contracts satisfying (1)   (2). This is the set
that includes all feasible banking contracts in the traditional bank run literature.
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A banking contract that satises (1)  (2) allows for a run equilibrium if
Eu(not withdrawjall other patient depositors withdraw) < (3)
Eu(withdrawjall other patient depositors withdraw);
where Eu denotes a patient depositors expected utility from his own action given the actions of all
other depositors. A contract that allows for a run equilibrium is called a run-admitting contract.
Given a run-admitting contract, if everyone else withdraws from the bank, the expected utility of
a patient depositor if he chooses to wait is strictly lower than the expected utility if he withdraws
as well. Let MRA denote the set that contains all run-admitting contracts. It is a subset of M .
In this simple model, a contract is run-admitting if c1 > 1. In the event that all people withdraw
their deposits from the bank, the bank will be out of resources. Each depositor receives payment
with probability 1=c1.
A banking contract m 2M is run-proof if it satises
Eu(not withdrawjall other patient depositors withdraw)  (4)
Eu(withdrawjall other patient depositors withdraw):
Let MRP denote the set that contains all run-proof contracts. It is a subset of M and is the
complement to MRA by denition.
Given a run-admitting contract, let depositors be coordinated by the sunspot variables if pos-
sible. In particular, I look for a correlated equilibrium (Aumann (1987)) that is based on the joint
distribution of the sunspot variables. Here I focus on the case in which depositors in the same
network take the same action, for I want to show how the sunspot signals coordinate peoples be-
havior. I assume pure strategies. Depositor js strategy set Sj is described by Sj ={withdraw, not
withdraw}. Depositors adopt the same action for the same value of i.
Denition 1 Given a run-admitting banking contract m 2 MRA; the distribution of the sunspot
variables Pr (1; 2) is a correlated equilibrium in the postdeposit game if (i) patient depositors in
network 1 withdraw their deposits when observing 1 = 1 and do not withdraw when observing
1 = 0; (ii) patient depositors in network 2 withdraw their deposits when observing 2 = 1 and do
not withdraw when observing 2 = 0.
This denition is equivalent to the following four conditions.
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For a patient depositor in network 1:
p10Eu(WjW, NW) + p11Eu(WjW, W)  p10Eu(NWjW, NW) + p11Eu(NWjW, W); (5)
p01Eu(NWjNW, W) + p00Eu(NWjNW, NW)  p01Eu(WjNW, W) + p00Eu(WjNW, NW); (6)
For a patient depositor in network 2:
p11Eu(WjW, W) + p01Eu(WjNW, W)  p11Eu(NWjW, W) + p01Eu(NWjNW, W); (7)
p10Eu(NWjW, NW) + p00Eu(NWjNW, NW)  p10Eu(WjW, NW) + p00Eu(WjNW, NW); (8)
where W stands for withdraw, and NW for not withdraw. The rst argument in Eu() is the action
of an individual depositor. The second argument denotes the action of the depositors in network 1,
and the third argument is the action of the depositors in network 2. The expected utility depends
on an individual depositors own action, the actions of his network members, and the actions of
depositors in the other network. Other parameters such as c1, , n1, and n2 are suppressed here.
If a patient depositor in network 1 observes 1 = 1, then by conditional probabilities he knows
that with probability p11p11+p10 network 2 observes 2 = 1 and withdraws, and with probability
p10
p11+p10
network 2 observes 2 = 0 and waits. For a correlated equilibrium, a patient depositor in network 1
should nd withdrawthe best response given the strategies of the members of the other network
and his own network. Therefore, (5) holds. If 1 = 0, then a patient depositor in network 1 knows
that network 2 will run on the bank with probability p01p01+p00 and will not run with probability
p00
p01+p00
. His network members will not withdraw, and he should nd not withdraw the best
response that maximizes his expected utility. Thus, (6) holds. Similarly, we have equations (7) and
(8) for a patient depositor in network 2.
Let MCE denote the set of run-admitting banking contracts that satisfy (5)  (8). (5) and (7)
can be interpreted as the incentive compatibility constraints for running on the bank given the
probability that some, but not all, patient depositors wait until the last period. (6) and (8) are the
incentive compatibility constraints for waiting given the probability that some, but not all, patient
depositors run on the bank. Because a contract in MCE has to satisfy four additional constraints
in addition to that it is feasible and run-admitting, MCE is a subset of MRA. Two noises exist
in the randomizing device, p01 and p10. If both of them are zero, then the randomizing device is
perfect, and we are back to the Peck-Shell (2003) sunspot approach. For a perfect randomizing
device, MCE =MRA.
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Given the information structure, not all contracts permit a correlated equilibrium. Proposition
1 demonstrates that for any feasible run-admitting contract, there are upper bounds of the noises,
below which the contract permits a correlated equilibrium. Proposition 2 shows that the set of
feasible contracts that allow for a correlated equilibrium diminishes when the noises in signals (p01
and p10) increase.
Proposition 1 Given any feasible demand-deposit contractm 2M and p11; there exist "
 
p11; c
1
 
0 and 
 
p10; p11; c
1

such that if p01  "
 
p11; c
1

and p10  
 
p10; p11; c
1

; the contract allows for
a correlated equilibrium in the postdeposit game. "
 
p11; c
1

= 0 and/or 
 
p10; p11; c
1

= 0 if and
only if c1 = R1 +R :
Proof. See appendix.
With noises in the sunspot information, depositors face uncertainty when they make with-
drawals. (5)   (8) are the conditions for individual depositors to follow their signals given the
probability that the other network runs on the bank. When the participation incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is binding, only the minimum requirement for a patient depositor to wait is satised.
Any increase in the measure of depositors running on the bank, or any increase in the probability
of more than  measure of depositors running on the bank, breaks down the participation incentive
compatibility constraint. Therefore, if c1 = R1 +R , the contract does not allow for a correlated
equilibrium unless p10 = p01 = 0. On the other hand, if the participation incentive compatibility
constraint is unbinding, then there is room for the possible increase in the measure of depositors
running on the bank, and in an individual depositors own interest, he still would prefer to wait.
Hence, all other feasible contracts allow a correlated equilibrium if noises are small enough.
Given the joint probability of 1 and 2, denote the set of contracts that satises (5)   (8) by
MCE (p11; p01; p10). The following proposition illustrates that the set MCE (p11; p01; p10) shrinks
when the noises (p01 and p10) get larger.
Proposition 2 If ( p011; p001; p010)  ( p11; p01; p10) ; (p001; p010)  (p01; p10) andMCE (p011; p001; p010) 6=
?; then MCE (p011; p001; p010) MCE (p11; p01; p10).
Proof. See appendix.
The strategies in the postdeposit game are complementary. If more people run on the bank or
the probability of bank runs is increased, then an individual depositors incentive to wait falls as
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the expected payo¤ in the last period is lowered. Similarly, if more people wait or the probability
of non-run is increased, then a patient depositors expected payo¤ at t = 2 is raised, and he is more
willing to wait. With a perfect randomizing device, that is, p01 = 0 and p10 = 0, an individual
depositor knows that all other depositors take the same action as he does. With the decrease in p11
and the increase in p01 and p10, the conditional probabilities Pr(i = 0jj = 1) and Pr(i = 1jj = 0)
are increased. Receiving a signal, an individual depositor knows that the other network is more
likely to take a di¤erent action. Given the contract, due to the strategic complementarity, it is
better for an individual depositor to switch to the other networks action rather than follow her
own signal for p01 and p10 are above the thresholds. Hence, as p10 and p01 increase, there are
fewer contracts consistent with the denition of the correlated equilibrium. In an extreme case, for
example, if p01 = 1   p11 and p11 is small enough, there is no contract allowing for a correlated
equilibrium. When a banking contract m falls in the subset of MRAnMCE , it neither allows for a
coordinating equilibrium nor is run-proof.1 In this situation, we are back to the original Diamond-
Dybvig world in which a contract has a run as well as a non-run equilibrium. According to the
traditional Diamond-Dybvig interpretation, if such a contract is o¤ered, at t = 0, depositors would
either accept it, believing non-run equilibrium will take place, or not accept it, believing the run
equilibrium will occur.
The following example is provided to explain the partitions of feasible banking contracts.
A Numerical Example:
Let u(c) =
(c+ b)   b

,  =  1, b = 0:5. R = 1:5,  = 0:4, n1 = n2 = 0:5, p11 = p01 = p10 =
0:001.
In this example, M , MRP , MCE and MRAnMCE are as follows (summarized by c1):
Banking contract c1
M [0; 1:2500]
MRP [0; 1]
MCE (1; 1:2495]
MRAnMCE (1:2495; 1:2500]
In a correlated equilibrium, there are three possible outcomes. If 1 = 2 = 1, all depositors
withdraw deposits. If 1 = 0 and 2 = 1, or if 1 = 1 and 2 = 0, only a fraction of patient
1Soloman (2003, 2004) does not have this problem due to the assumptions that foreigners are paid in nominal
asset and they are risk neutural.
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depositors run on the bank. No patient depositor runs on the bank when 1 = 2 = 0. I dene a
full bank run, partial bank run, and non-bank run as follows:
Denition 2 (Full Bank Run) In the postdeposit game, if all depositors withdraw deposits, then a
full bank run occurs.
Denition 3 (Partial Bank Run) In the postdeposit game, if some, not all, patient depositors
withdraw deposits, then a partial bank run occurs.
Denition 4 (Non-Bank Run) In the postdeposit game, if all patient depositors do not withdraw
deposits in period 1, then a non-bank run occurs.
By denition, in a correlated equilibrium, depositors in both networks interpret a signal of value
1 as the sign to withdraw and 0 as the sign to wait. Generally speaking, because sunspots do not
a¤ect the fundamentals, people can interpret the signals in any way they please. For example, one
network views 1 as the signal to wait, and the other network treats 0 as the signal to run. Thus,
an imperfect information structure can allow for more than one type of correlated equilibrium. In
this paper, the interpretations of signals are assumed to be exogenously given. Instead of varying
the interpretations, the joint probability distribution of 1 and 2 can be changed to achieve the
same results. If the exogenous uncertainty is understood as the uncertainty in fundamentals taken
to the limit, then it can be understood that people usually have common views on which signal is
good and which is bad.
Given the imperfect randomizing device, not every run-admitting contract allows for a correlated
equilibrium. Before I start the welfare analysis, let me clarify the strategies of an individual
depositor in the postdeposit game. To start with a banking contract m 2M;
1. If m 2 MCE , that is, m allows for a correlated equilibrium, then patient depositors are
coordinated by the sunspots. Patient depositors withdraw the deposits when i = 1, i = 1; 2
is observed, and wait otherwise.
2. If m 2 MRP , then patient depositors do not run regardless of the realization of the sunspot
variable.
3. If m 2 MRAnMCE , then the contract neither allows for a correlated equilibrium nor is run-
proof. The randomizing device fails. Depositors either accept the o¤er ex ante and do not
run ex post, or reject the o¤er ex ante and anticipate that the run equilibrium always occurs.
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In the last two scenarios, sunspots do not matter in the postdeposit game, because the strategies
of depositors are independent of the realization of the sunspot signals.
4 Predeposit Game
Knowing the strategies of depositors in the postdeposit game given the information structure, the
presentative bank chooses the optimal contract to o¤er at t = 0. As a result of a competitive
market, the bank o¤ers a contract that maximizes depositors expected utility. If the contract
yields an ex-ante expected utility level higher than that under autarky, depositors will accept it
and the postdeposit game will be played. In all other cases, depositors prefer to stay in autarky.
The same notation is used in this section to denote the banking contracts in the predeposit
game. The bank can choose from three types of contracts, corresponding to the partitions of M in
the postdeposit game. I will rst calculate the ex-ante expected utility obtained given a contract
m 2MRP and a contract m 2MCE , assuming the depositors always accept the banking contract.
I also calculate the ex-ante expected utility if a non-run occurs given a run-admitting contract
that does not allow for a correlated equilibrium. A su¢ cient condition for an optimal contract
to tolerate a correlated equilibrium in the postdeposit game is that the best contract in MCE is
better than the best contract inMRP and than the best outcome (non-run) given a best contract in
MRAnMCE . If the ex-ante utility is higher than that under the autarky, the depositor will accept
the contract ex ante.
A run-proof contract is a contract such that a patient depositor weakly prefers to wait even
though everyone else withdraws the deposits. In the demand-deposit contract framework, a banking
contract is run-proof if and only if c1  1. It is equivalent to the autarky when c1 = 1. Because
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is greater than 1, the banking contract that depositors are
willing to accept ex ante should satisfy c1  1. Thus, the only ex-ante acceptable run-proof contract
requires c1 = 1, which results in the same allocation as under autarky. I impose an assumption
that if a contract yields expected utility equal to that under autarky, people still deposit in the
bank. With this assumption, the bank can at least o¤er the run-proof contract to the depositors.
The expected utility under the run-proof contract in the predeposit game is:
WRP (m) = u(1) + (1  )u(R) (9)
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Next, I discuss the expected utility given a contract that allows for a correlated equilibrium in
the postdeposit game. I dene the correlated equilibrium in the predeposit game as follows.
Denition 5 Given a feasible contract m 2M , the predeposit game has a correlated equilibrium if
there is a subgame perfect Nash-Aumann equilibrium in which (i) depositors are willing to deposit
and (ii) the postdeposit game has a correlated equilibrium.
I use partial run 1 and partial run 2 to distinguish the partial runs conducted by networks 1
and 2, respectively. If the contract admits a correlated equilibrium, then the probabilities of full
bank runs, partial bank runs, and non-bank run are determined by the information structure. The
probabilities of having a full run and a non-run are p11 and p00; respectively. The probabilities of
having partial runs driven by networks 1 and 2 are p11 and p01; respectively. I assume the social
welfare is the aggregated expected utilities of individual depositors and all depositors are weighted
equally. In the following context, welfare and ex-ante expected utility are used interchangeably.
When a non-bank run occurs, the welfare, denoted by Wnon run(m), is
Wnon run(m) = u(c1) + (1  )u

1  c1
1   R

:
When partial run i occurs, the welfare, denoted by W p run i(m), i = 1; 2; is
W p run i(m) =
8><>:
1
c1
u(c1); if (ni + n i)c1 > 1;
(ni + n i)u(c1) + (1  )n iu

1  (ni + n i)c1
(1  )n i R

; otherwise.
Note thatW p run i(m) is continuous in c1. Also note that given c1  1; the welfare under a partial
run is strictly less than that under a non-run.
When a full bank run occurs, the welfare, denoted by W run(m), is
W run(m) =
1
c1
u(c1):
Given the probabilities, the best contract o¤ered by the bank, which allows for a correlated equi-
librium, is
W^ (m) = max
c1
p11W
run(m) + p10W
p run 1(m) + p01W p run 2(m) + p00Wnon run(m) (PCE)
s:t: m 2MCE :
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Given p11; the value function of problem PCE is strictly decreasing in noises for two reasons:
First, the set of contracts that allows for correlated equilibrium shrinks when noises increase. Hence,
the choice set is smaller. Second, because the welfare under partial runs is lower than that under
non-run, the same contract yields the lower expected utility if the probabilities of partial runs are
larger and the probability of non-run is smaller.
Lemma 1 Given p11, the value function of problem PCE is strictly decreasing in p01 and p10 for
MCE (p11; p01; p10) 6= ?:
Proof. By proposition 2, given p11, the set of MCE diminishes when p01 and/or p10 increase. Let
(p001; p010)  (p01; p10) and (p001; p010) 6= (p01; p10). The solution to PCE given (p11; p001; p010) ; m0 = 
c10; c20

; is in MCE (p11; p01; p10) : Plug m0 =
 
c10; c20

into the objective function of PCE given
(p11; p01; p10) : Denote the welfare achieved by W (m0; p11; p01; p10): The welfare under partial runs
is lower than non-run, so W (m0; p11; p01; p10) > W^ (m0; p11; p001; p010). Because W^ (m; p11; p01; p10) is
at least as high as W (m0; p11; p01; p10), W^ (m; p11; p01; p10) > W^ (m0; p11; p001; p010).
Proposition 3 and its corollary demonstrate that there exist upper bounds of the probabilities
of full runs, partial runs, and non-run, below which a contract has a correlated equilibrium in the
predeposit game.
Proposition 3 There exist p11 > 0; p01 (p11)  0; and p10 (p11; p01)  0 such that for p11  p11;
p01  p01 (p11) ; and p10  p10 (p11; p01) ; there exist at least one feasible demand-deposit contract
m =
 
c1; c2

allowing for a correlated equilibrium and is strictly better than the run-proof contract.
p01 (p11) = 0; and p10 (p11; p01) = 0.
Proof. The optimal contract allowing for a correlated equilibrium solves problem PCE. Given p11,
if p01 = p10 = 0; the problem is the same as the traditional symmetric sunspot equilibrium problem.
The conditions for a correlated equilibrium are always satised. According to Cooper and Ross
(1998), there is a unique cuto¤ level of p11, above which a run-proof contract is better and below
which the optimal contract is run-admitting. Denote this cuto¤ level by p11.
Given p11 and p10 = 0, the value function of PCE is strictly decreasing in p01 by lemma 1. If
p11 = p11, only p01 = 0 can make a run-admitting contract as good as a run-proof contract. Hence,
p01 (p11) = p11.
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If p11 < p11 and p01 = p10 = 0, the value of PCE is strictly higher than that of a run-proof
contract. Holding p11 < p11 and p10 = 0, p01 can be increased a little bit and the value of PCE is
still higher than the value of a run-proof contract. Note that the set of MCE is diminishing in p01.
Let p?01 (p11) denote the cuto¤ of value of p01, below which the set of M
CE is not empty and above
which it is empty. If the value of PCE at p?01 (p11) is lower than W
RP , then by the monotonicity of
the value function, a cuto¤ p01 depending on p11 can be found, below which the contract allowing
for a correlated equilibrium is better than the run-proof contract, and above which the run-proof
contract is better. Denote such p01 by pV01 (p11). Let p01 (p11) = min

p?01 (p11) ; p
V
01 (p11)
	
. It is the
cuto¤ value of p01; below which the contract allowing for a correlated equilibrium is better than
the run-proof contract, above which the run-proof contract is better, or there is no contract that
allows for a correlated equilibrium.
The value function of PCE is not necessarily continuous, because the choice set can be noncon-
vex. We need to prove that p01 (p11) is not equal to 0 for p11 < p11. Let c1 denote the solution to
problem PCE with p01 = p10 = 0 and p11 < p11. According to Ennis and Keister (2004), c1 can
not be R1 +R . By proposition 1, given p11, c
1 is a feasible contract that allows for a correlated
equilibrium for p01  "
 
p11; c
1 ; where "  p11; c1 > 0. The welfare at c1 on p01  "  p11; c1
is continuous in p01. So p01 can be increased at least to minfp11   p11; "
 
p11; c
1g and c1 can
still be better than the run-proof contract. Thus, when p11 < p11, the cuto¤ level of p01 > 0.
Let p11  p11 and p01  p01 (p11), the same process can be repeated to prove there exists
p10 (p11; p01)  0. Therefore, if the probabilities of partial runs and full runs are small, then the
contract that allows for a correlated equilibrium is better than the run-proof contract.
Because the best run-proof contract is equivalent to autarky, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 For p11  p11; p01  p01 (p11) and p10  p10 (p11; p01), there exists at least one feasible
banking contract such that the predeposit game has a correlated equilibrium.
If m 2 MRAnMCE , the best outcome one can hope for is that all depositors anticipate the
non-run equilibrium in the postdeposit game, and that depositors deposit at the bank ex ante and
they do not run at t = 1. The welfare of the best outcome is given by:
W^ (m) = max
c1
u(c1) + (1  )u

1  c1
1   R

(PDD)
s:t: m 2MRAnMCE :
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A su¢ cient condition for allowing for a correlated equilibrium is that the welfare of the best
m 2 MCE is higher than that of the best run-proof contract and that of the best outcome of the
best m in MRAnMCE . Similarly, a run-proof contract will be the best if the welfare is higher than
that of the best m in MCE and than the best outcome of the optimal contract in MRAnMCE .
The objective function of PDD is not a¤ected by p11, p01 or p10, but the choice set increases
in p01 and p10 given p11. Thus, the value function of PDD is increasing in p01 and p10. However,
because the choice set is not necessarily convex, the value function can be discontinuous at p01 = 0
and/or p10 = 0.
Some computed examples indicate that in some economies the optimal contract allows for a
correlated equilibrium and in other economies, the run-proof contract is optimal.
Proposition 4 In some economies, the optimal demand-deposit banking contract allows for a cor-
related equilibrium.
Proof. Prove by example. All parameters are the same as in the previous example. The expected
utilities of the optimal contracts inMCE ; MRP ; and the best outcome inMRAnMCE are as follows:
m in c1 W^ (m)
MRP 1 1:4333
MCE 1:0707 1:4341
MRAnMCE ! 1:2495 ! 1:4286
The optimal contract in this example is c1 = 1:0707; which yields a welfare level of 1:4341. It is
better than the best run-proof contract and autarky. If m in MRAnMCE , in the best situation,
that is, depositors accept the contract and do not run ex post, the highest welfare level is 1:4286,
which is still lower than that underMCE and also lower than that under autarky. Thus, depositors
will not accept the contract in the rst place. Hence, the optimal m is in MCE in this example.
By Proposition 4, the asymmetric randomizing device can be part of the equilibrium in an
economy. The full bank runs and partial bank runs are equilibrium phenomena. Runs are tolerated
because the gain from liquidity smoothing is large.
Corollary 2 In some economies, the optimal demand-deposit banking contract is run-proof.
Proof. Prove by example. The example in the previous section is used here, but p11, p01; and p10
are varied. Let p11 = p01 = p10 = 0:005. The expected utilities of the optimal contracts in MCE ;
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MRP ; and the best outcome in MRAnMCE are as follows:
m in c1 W^ (m)
MRP 1 1:4333
MCE 1:0610 1:4330
MRAnMCE ! 1:2476 ! 1:4287
The run-proof contract is the best one.
The best outcome in MRAnMCE can achieve higher welfare than the best run-proof contract
and the best contract that allows for a correlated equilibrium. Let us continue the example, but
let p11 = 0:1, p01 = 0:2 and p10 = 0:4. The welfare is as follows:
m in c1 W^ (m)
MRP 1 1:4333
MCE ! 1 ! 1:3933
MRAnMCE ! 1:1407 ! 1:4335
In this economy, it is hard to tell which contract is optimal. A run-proof contract is better than
a contract that allows for a coordinating equilibrium. But, if this randomizing device is not used,
then a higher welfare level may be achieved.
So far the analysis is based on a simple demand-deposit contract. However, the results hold in
a broad class of banking mechanism. In the appendix, I consider a banking contract that allows
for partial suspension of convertibility. A correlated equilibrium exists in some economies. Bank
runs and partial runs are tolerated in some economies.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I extend the analysis of panic-based runs to include an asymmetric-information,
extrinsic randomizing device. I show that in an economy with asymmetric sunspot information
structure, there exists a correlated equilibrium for some demand-deposit contracts. In this equi-
librium, a full bank run, a partial bank run, or non-bank run occurs, depending on the realization
of the sunspot signals. In some economies, the optimal banking contract tolerates full runs and
partial runs. The run-proof banking contract is not the best, because it sacrices too much welfare.
Interestingly, there are banking contracts that are neither run-proof nor consistent with cor-
related equilibrium if sunspots are imperfectly observed. It is hard to describe the equilibrium
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without further discussion of game theory or further assumptions on the preference of depositors.
Therefore, the analysis provides a necessary condition for using a run-proof banking contract or a
contract allowing for a correlated equilibrium. Su¢ cient condition also is discussed, assuming the
best outcome of a run-admitting contract that does not allow for a correlated equilibrium. These
results hold in a broad class of banking mechanisms, including partial suspension of convertibility.
The exogenously given interpretation of the signal is assumed in this paper. However, taking
the sunspot seriously, depositors can interpret the signals in any way they prefer. When people are
allowed to choose networks, there also can be multiple equilibria in the predeposit game. Which
equilibrium is mostly likely to occur? In the extension of this paper, I will consider the renement
of the equilibria and aim to provide a better answer to these remaining questions.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1Given any feasible demand-deposit contractm 2M and p11; there exist "
 
p11; c
1
 
0 and 
 
p10; p11; c
1

such that if p01  "
 
p11; c
1

and p10  
 
p10; p11; c
1

the contract allows for
a correlated equilibrium in the postdeposit game. "
 
p11; c
1

= 0 and/or 
 
p10; p11; c
1

= 0 if and
only if c1 = R1 +R :
Proof. When p01 = 0; (6)   (7) are satised for any feasible demand-deposit contract. p01 does
not a¤ect (5) and (8). Given p11 and c1; p10 can achieve its upper bound when p01 is 0.
Suppose (n1 + n2) c1  1 and (n1 + n2) c1  1: Let p01 = 0; rewrite equations (5) and (8)
explicitly, we get
p00
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u  c1i  p10 hu  c1  u1 (n1+n2)c1n2(1 ) Ri   p11 1c1u  c1
By simple algebra, we get "
 
p11; c
1

; the upper bound of p10, "
 
p11; c
1

; as follows:
" =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
min
8<:1  p11; p11 1c1 u(c1)u1 (n1+n2)c1n2(1 ) R u(c1)
9=; ; if u  c1 < u1 (n1+n2)c1n2(1 ) R ;
(1 p11)

u

1 c1
1  R

 u(c1)

u

1 c1
1  R

 u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n2(1 ) R
 ; if u  c1  u1 (n1+n2)c1n2(1 ) R :
It is easy to see that " = 0 if and only if 1 c
1
1  R = c
1.
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Given p10 < "
 
p11; c
1

; the upper bound of p01;

 
p11; p01; c
1

= min
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1 p11 p10)

u

1 c1
1  R

 u(c1)

u

1 c1
1  R

 u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n1(1 ) R
 ;
p11
1
c1
u(c1)
u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n1(1 ) R

 u(c1)
; 1  p11  
p10

u

1 c1
1  R

 u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n2(1 ) R

u

1 c1
1  R

 u(c1)
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
if u
 
c1

< u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n1(1 ) R

;

 
p11; p01; c
1

= min
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(1 p11 p10)

u

1 c1
1  R

 u(c1)

u

1 c1
1  R

 u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n1(1 ) R
 ;
1  p11  
p10

u

1 c1
1  R

 u

1 (n1+n2)c1
n2(1 ) R

u

1 c1
1  R

 u(c1)
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
if u
 
c1
  u1 (n1+n2)c1n1(1 ) R :
With 1 c
1
1  R = c
1; we have " = 0, the only possible value of p10 is 0. It is easy to see that
 = 0: Also, the only way to make  = 0 is to have 1 c
1
1  R = c
1 regardless of the value of p10.
In the same way, we can get the upper bound of p01 and p10 for the other three cases in which
(1) (n1 + n2) c1 > 1 and (n1 + n2) c1  1; or (2) (n1 + n2) c1  1 and (n1 + n2) c1 > 1; or (3)
(n1 + n2) c
1 < 1 and (n1 + n2) c1 < 1:
Proposition 2 If ( p011; p001; p010)  ( p11; p01; p10) ; (p001; p010)  (p01; p10) and MCE (p11; p01; p10) 6=
?; then MCE (p011; p001; p010) MCE (p11; p01; p10).
Proof. Prove the proposition in two steps. First, I illustrate that for any m in MCE (p011; p001; p010),
it is also inMCE (p11; p01; p10). Second, I determine that there exists some m inMCE (p11; p01; p10)
but not in MCE (p011; p001; p010).
Let m 2 MCE (p011; p001; p010). Discuss cases by parameters. If (n1 + n2)c1  1 and (n1 +
n2)c
1  1, rewrite (5)  (8) as
p010
h
u(c1)  u(1 (n1+n2)c1(1 )n2 R)
i
  p011 1c1u(c1) (50)
 p001
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u(1 (n1+n2)c1(1 )n1 R)
i
  p010
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u(c1)
i
  (1  p011)
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u(c1)
i
(60)
p001
h
u(c1)  u(1 (n1+n2)c1(1 )n1 R)
i
  p011 1c1u(c1) (70)
 p010
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u(1 (n1+n2)c1(1 )n2 R)
i
  p001
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u(c1)
i
  (1  p011)
h
u

1 c1
1  R

  u(c1)
i
(80)
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Note that (50) (60) and (70) (80) are symmetric in terms of p01 and p10: Therefore, the analysis
can be focused on (50)   (60). The RHS of (50) is negative. An increase in p011 to p11 decreases
the RHS. If u(c1)   u(1 (n1+n2)c1(1 )n2 R)  0; any change in p010 does not change the sign of (50). If
u(c1)  u(1 (n1+n2)c1(1 )n2 R) < 0, a decrease in p010 to p10 rises the LHS. Therefore, the inequality sign
in (50) still holds for ( p011; p001; p010)  ( p11; p01; p10) :In (60) ; each term in the brackets is positive.
The LHS is decreasing in p001 and p010, and the RHS is increasing in p011. Therefore, the contract m
satises (60) for ( p011; p001; p010)  ( p11; p01; p10). Same reasoning for (70) and (80).
In the second step, I show that for ( p011; p001; p010)  ( p11; p01; p10), there exists a con-
tract m that is in MCE (p11; p01; p10) but not in MCE (p011; p001; p010). Suppose that there is m 2
MCE (p11; p01; p10) such that at least one of (5)  (8) is binding. Change in the probabilities from
( p11; p01; p10) to ( p011; p001; p010) breaks down the inequality sign, such that at least one of (5) (8)
is no longer satised. Such a contract is not inMCE (p011; p001; p010) : Next, I prove that not every fea-
sible contract allows for a coordinating equilibrium, and some inequalities must be binding for some
m. Let p10; p01  0. Because at least one of p010 and p001 is strictly greater than zero, c1 = R1 +R
is no longer in MCE (p011; p001; p010) by proposition 1, which means at least one of the inequalities
does not hold at c1 = R1 +R : By the continuity of the utility function, the inequality must be
binding at some c1 because MCE (p11; p01; p10) is not empty.
The other three cases can be proved in a similar way.
Note, if p11 is small enough and p10 and p01 are large enough, MCE (p11; p10; p01) = ?:
6.2 A Banking Contract Allowing Partial Suspension of Convertibility
6.2.1 Model Set Up
Banking contracts will be generalized in this section. I discuss an economy that bears aggregate
uncertainty and let the contract be contingent on the positions of the depositors in the queue. To
keep the illustration simple, a discrete case will be analyzed here. I follow the notations and the
denitions in Peck and Shell (2003) as much as possible. There are N depositors in the economy,
among whom there are  number of impatient depositors, where   N is a random number with
probability density function f(). Each depositor is endowed with 1 unit of consumption good at
t = 0. The utility function of the impatient depositors is denoted by u(c1), and the utility function
of the patient depositors is by v(c1+ c2). u and v are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice
continuously di¤erentiable. The coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion of u and v are greater than 1.
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The specication of the information structure is the same as in the previous framework. De-
positors do not know which network they will be in ex ante. Network i has Ni number of de-
positors, where i = 1; 2, and N1 + N2 = N1. N1 and N2 are known ex ante. Depositors have
probability N1=N to be in network 1, and probability N2=N to be in network 2. For each ,
let i (0  i  minfNi; g) be the number of impatient depositors in network i, i = 1; 2, and
1+2 = . Denote the ex-ante conditional probability of having 1 impatient depositors in group
1, and 2 in group 2 conditional on  by g(1; 2j). The ex-ante probability that there are 
number of impatient depositors, 1 of them in group 1 and 2 of them in group 2 is:
h(1; 2; ) = f()g(1; 2j):
After the consumption shock and information shock are realized, the patient depositors update
the probability of  by Bayesrule conditional on their consumption type and information type
(which group he is in). The ex-post probability of , contingent on a depositor being patient is
denoted by fp(). The ex-post probability that there are i number of patient depositors in network
i contingent on  and on a patient depositor is in network i is denoted by gip(1; 2j): Hence, the
ex-post probability that there are  number of impatient depositors, and among them 1 are in
network 1 and 2 are in network 2 for a patient depositor in network i is:
hip(1; 2; ) = fp()g
i
p(1; 2j)
The technology is the same as in the demand-deposit case. Following Peck and Shell (2003),
let c1(z) denote the period 1 withdrawal of consumption by the depositor in arrival position z. The
resource constraint is
c2(1) =
N   1z=1c1(z)
N   1 R; c
1(N) = N  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z): (10)
Depositors do not know their positions in the line when they make withdrawals. They have
equal chance to be in any position in the line. If there are 1 depositors withdrawing the deposits,
then the probability of getting c1(z) will be 1
1
for z = 1; 2; ::; 1. Therefore, the expected utility
for a patient depositor if he withdraws the deposit in period 1 is 1
1
P1
z=1 v(c
1(z)):
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6.2.2 Postdeposit Game
A banking contract m that allows for partial suspension in the postdeposit game is described by
the vector
m = (c1(1); :::; c1(z); :::; c1(N); c2(0); :::; c2(N   1)) and
(c1(1); :::; c1(z); :::; c1(N); c2(0); :::; c2(N   1)) satises (10):
The participation incentive compatibility constraint requires
N 1X
=0
fp()v

N   z=1c1(z)
N    R


N 1X
=0
fp()
"
1
+ 1
+1X
z=1
v(c1(z))
#
: (11)
The set of feasible banking contracts M is dened as:
M =

m 2 R2N+ : (10)  (11) hold for all 
	
:
A run-proof contract requires
v

(N   N 1z=1 c1(z))R

 1
N
NX
z=1
v(c1(z)): (12)
The set of run-proof banking contracts MRP is dened as:
MRP = fm 2M : (12) hold for all g :
I continue to use the denition of correlated equilibrium as in the previous section. The corre-
sponding restrictions on the banking contract that allows for a correlated equilibrium are:
For a patient depositor in network 1:
p10
N 1X
=0
minfN1 1;gX
1=0
h1p(1; 2; )
PN1+2
z=1 v(c
1(z))
N1 + 2
+ p11
1
N
PN
z=1 v(c
1(z)) 
p10
N 1X
=0
minfN1 1;gX
1=0
h1p(1; 2; )v
 
N   N1+2 1z=1 c1(z)
2 + 1
R
!
+ p11v
h
N   N 1z=1 c1(z)
i
R
 (13)
p01
N 1X
=0
minfN1 1;gX
1=0
h1p(1; 2; )v
 
N   N2+1z=1 c1(z)
N1   1 R
!
+ p00
N 1X
=0
fp()v

Ny   z=1c1(z)
N    R


p01
N 1X
=0
minfN1 1;gX
1=0
h1p(1; 2; )
PN2+1+1
z=1 v(c
1(z))
N2 + 1 + 1
+ p00
N 1X
=0
fp()
P+1
z=1 v(c
1(z))
+ 1
(14)
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For a patient depositor in network 2:
p11
1
N
PN 1
z=1 v(c
1(z)) + p01
N 1X
=0
minfN2 1;gX
2=0
h2p(1; 2; )
PN2+1
z=1 v(c
1(z))
N2 + 1

p11v
h
N   N 1z=1 c1(z)
i
R

+ p01
N 1X
=0
minfN2 1;gX
2=0
h2p(1; 2; )v
 
N   N 1 1z=1 c1(z)
1 + 1
R
! (15)
p10
N 1X
=0
minfN2 1;gX
2=0
h2p(1; 2; )v
 
N   N1+2z=1 c1(z)
N2   2 R
!
+ p00
N 1X
=0
fp()v

Ny   z=1c1(z)
N    R)


p10
N 1X
=0
minfN2 1;gX
2=0
h2p(1; 2; )
PN1+2+1
z=1 v(c
1(z))
N1 + 2 + 1
+ p00
N 1X
=0
fp()
P+1
z=1 v(c
1(z))
+ 1
(16)
The set of banking contracts that are consistent with a correlated equilibrium is dened as:
MCE = fm 2M : (13)  (16) hold for all g :
An Example
The parameters in the following example are similar to that in Peck and Shell (2003). There are
two depositors; one in each network. The probability of being in either group is equal for both of
them ex ante. Let u(x) =
Ax1 a
1  a ; v(x) =
x1 b
1  b ; A = 7; a = b = 1:01; R = 1:1; y = 3. A depositor
is impatient with probability p, p = 0:4: In this simple example, there is only one choice variable,
which is c1(1).
Let p11 = 0:001; p01 = 0:009; p10 = 0. Sets of banking contracts are described as follows:
m in c1 (1)
M [0; 3:2937]
MRP [0; 3:2852]
MCE [3:2928; 3:2936]
MRAnMCE (3:2852; 3:2928) [ (3:2936; 3:2937]
6.2.3 Predeposit Game
In the predeposit game, the bank decides the best contract to o¤er. The depositors compare
the welfare under autarky with the ex-ante welfare the contract yields. The optimal m 2 MCE
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that allows for a correlated equilibrium can be calculated in the same way as in the previous
section. p11, p10, p01; and p00 are the probabilities of full runs, partial runs driven by network
1, partial runs driven by network 2, and non-run, respectively. The examples below show that in
some economies, the optimal banking contract with partial suspension of convertibility tolerates a
correlated equilibrium. In some economies, the optimal banking contract with partial suspension
of convertibility is run-proof.
Examples
The economy has three depositors: network 1 has 1 depositor and network 2 has 2 depositors.
 = 0:5. u(x) =
Ax1 a
1  a ; v(x) =
x1 b
1  b ; A = 10; a = b = 1:01; R = 2: There are two choice variables
here: c1(1) and c1(2): Welfare is normalized to be W + 1646: In autarky, W aut =  1:9473:
(1) p11 = 0:0001; p01 = 0:0009
The highest ex-ante welfare levels that the best contracts in each subset can achieve are:
m in c1(1) c1(2) W^ (m)
MRP 1:5780 0:9826 0:3366
MCE 1:6226 1:0368 0:4023
MRAnMCE 1:6545 1:0289 0:4005
(2) p11 = 0:0008; p01 = 0:0002
The highest ex-ante welfare levels that the best contracts in each subset can achieve are:
m in c1(1) c1(2) W^ (m)
MRP 4:7340 2:9479 0:3280
MCE 4:8678 3:1097 0:3911
MRAnMCE 4:9643 3:0865 0:3912
(3) The example in the postdeposit game continued. The welfare in each partition of M is
calculated as follows. The welfare is normalized to be W + 673:
m in c1(1) W^ (m)
MRP 3:2852 0:787
MCE 3:2936 0:791
MRAnMCE 3:2937 0:793
The welfare under autarky is W = 0:5427:
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In this example, the best run-proof contract and the best contract that allows for a correlated
equilibrium will be accepted ex ante. However, a run-proof contract is inferior to a contract that
allows for a correlated equilibrium.
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